Outcomes of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the Arab World by Mariappuram, Rosann
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 
2015 
Outcomes of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the Arab World 
Rosann Mariappuram 
CUNY City College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/378 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 


















Outcomes of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 























"Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
Chapter 3: Overview of CEDAW 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology and Evaluation of Rights 
 
Chapter 5:  Sudan 
 
Chapter 6: Morocco 
 
Chapter 7: Jordan 
 
Chapter 8: Saudi Arabia 
 




















The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention to End All Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 and it is currently the 2
nd
 most ratified human rights 
convention after the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However critics argue that 
many of the states that ratified CEDAW continue to discriminate against women and 
girls. The region of the world where critics seem to focus much of their attention on is the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Islam and the implementation of sharia law are 
often cited as the sources of discrimination against Arab women. However is this a fair 
assessment of the Arab people and their culture?  
This research project will examine the question, how has the Convention to 
Eliminate All forms of Discrimination Against Women impacted the rights of Muslim 
women? The research project identifies four case studies - Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and 
Saudi Arabia – will assess how CEDAW has impacted the change in women’s political 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. CEDAW is currently the 
2
nd
 most ratified human rights convention after the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. However human rights activists often argue that many of the states that ratified 
CEDAW continue to violate the human rights of women and girls. The region of the 
world where critics seem to focus much of their attention is the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). The religion of Islam and its use of shari’a law are often cited as the 
sources of discrimination against Muslim women in the MENA region. However is this a 
fair assessment of the Islamic people and their countries? To assess this judgment of 
CEDAW and of the Arab world, my master’s thesis will ask the research question, how 
has CEDAW impacted the rights of Arab women since its ratification? 
This research project examines the ongoing debate in international relations about 
the development and effectiveness of international norms. Realism argues that states in 
the international system operate using rational decision making based on their individual 
interests. Liberalism believes states operate using normative values and institutions to 
guide their actions. Scholars Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink posit that norms are 
single standards of behavior and institutions are the social structures that uphold 
normative values.
1
  To that end, treaties such as CEDAW are institutions that codify and 
uphold international norms. Thirty five years have passed since the ratification of 
CEDAW and most of the research on its effectiveness has been very broad, such as Wade 
M. Cole’s 2013 article that analyzed 177 countries that have ratified CEDAW. In Cole’s 
                                                        
1
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 891, doi:10.2307/2601361. 
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research he cited Arab states as countries with high ratification rates but low progress on 
women’s rights. 
2
 Yet his paper contained no deeper analysis of the cause of this delay in 
reform other than a general statement that the religion of Islam may contain inherently 
anti-women values. My thesis research will begin to fill that unexplored space and seek 
to understand the effectiveness of implementing international norms using international 
law.   
Identifying the reasons why women’s rights in the Middle East have not 
progressed at a rate of other CEDAW signatories is critical to fulfilling the intention of 
the convention. By examining and challenging the existing academic research on this 
issue, including the assumption that Islam is an inherently anti-women faith, this research 
project seeks to identify ways to improve Muslim women’s economic, political, and 
social rights.  
 
Hypothesis  
 My first hypothesis is a result of two ideas. First, that international norms codified 
into human rights treaties can change state behavior. And second, that it is easier to 
change political norms than social and cultural norms using international law. Based on 
these two ideas I would like to test the following hypothesis;  
H1: Arab States that have ratified CEDAW and do not have a stated reservation 
to Article 2 have seen improvement in women’s rights since ratification. And 
those countries who are not CEDAW participants or have reservations that 
                                                        
2
 Wade M. Cole, “Government Respect for Gendered Rights: The Effect of the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Women’s Rights Outcomes, 1981-2004.,” International 
Studies Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 2013): 246. 
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essentially nullify the treaty, conversely have not seen improvements in women’s 
rights. 
Article 2 of CEDAW commits states to working to enforce the rights outlined in the 
convention. Any state that has a stated reservation to Article 2 has effectively nullified 
their ratification of the convention. To test my hypothesis I will use qualitative case 
studies of states that both have and do not have stated objections to article 2.  
My second hypothesis is based on political reforms to many Islamic countries’ 
constitutions over the past several years that have allowed for women to become more 
active in government as a result of movements like the Arab Spring. States such as 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt have all seen an increase in female voting and participation 
in public office. I argue that this is because nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) both 
in and outside of Muslim countries have used CEDAW as an advocacy tool to push for 
political reform. My second hypothesis states: 
H2: More progress has been made in political rights rather than social rights in 
states that have ratified CEDAW. 
To test this second hypothesis in my case studies I will examine the change in both 
political and social rights after a state has ratified CEDAW. States that have ratified the 
convention had to do so through domestic institutions, such as their parliaments. This 
connection between state institutions and CEDAW allows NGOs a clearer path for whom 
and how to lobby for women’s rights. However, since many Islamic states govern their 
family code outside of their civil institutions, I argue that CEDAW makes it easier for 
NGOs to push for political rights rather than social rights, such as the right to divorce or 
inherit property.   
 7 
Making the argument 
Before examining the methodology of this research program we must look at the 
ideas that motivate my two hypothesizes. The first idea assumes international norms can 
change state behavior when they are institutionalized into human rights treaties. The 
literature review will explore the history and several examples of this assumption. 
Applying this assumption to women’s rights leads us to the challenge of CEDAW. While 
CEDAW remains one of the most ratified human rights treaties in UN history, its failure 
to influence change in Islamic states is frequently counted as proof that human rights 
cannot be forced upon an unwilling state. However this research program unearths 
inherent flaws within the ratification process of CEDAW that I argue are a large reason 
why Islamic states have not fully adopted the treaty. Since Islamic states were allowed to 
ratify CEDAW while also putting forth reservations that undermine the heart of the 
treaty, they essentially did not agree to the norm that women should have equality in 
political and social rights. This research program will show that Islamic states which did 
not put forth such reservations or which repealed their initial reservations did make 
progress on women’s political and social rights, thus taking steps towards fulfilling the 
normative values of CEDAW.  
The idea underlying the second hypothesis is that political rights are easier to 
achieve than social rights. This separation of rights is based on how rights are affirmed by 
institutions. For example, in many countries to claim ownership of property an individual 
must register their claim with the government. A title or deed is then given as proof of 
ownership, creating a contract between the individual and their country that proves their 
right to the land. Conversely, the right to education is harder to prove or enforce. A state 
 8 
may make a law that education is a right for all citizens, but unless the state also provides 
free public education and punishes truancy, it is difficult to guarantee educational access. 
Institutions are key to the protection of rights but social rights often fall outside of their 
purview. Thus, my second hypothesis argues that CEDAW is most effective in helping 
push forward the political rights of women.  
 
Methodology 
My qualitative analysis involves selecting five Islamic states as case studies and 
comparing the change in women’s social and political rights both before and after the 
ratification of CEDAW in each state. The independent variable is whether or not a state 
has ratified CEDAW. The dependent variable is the quality of women’s rights in each 
state. From CEDAW’s main text I have identified eight political and social rights that are 





Definition of right 
Type of 
right 
7 Women have the right to vote  political 
7 Women can hold public office  political 
9 Women have citizenship  political 
10 Women can access education social 
10 Women can access contraception  social 
11 Women are allowed to be employed outside of the home social 
15 Women are allowed to own property political 
16 Women are free from coerced marriage social 
 
This list is not exhaustive of all the rights CEDAW guarantees for women. And 
several rights not specified by CEDAW have also been omitted from this list, such as the 
right to abortion care. These eight rights were selected because they are clearly identified 
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in the text of the convention and there is publicly available data to assess them 
effectively.  
 To examine the eight social and political rights in each case study country I will 
gather information from various sources including the U.S. State Department’s annual 
Human Rights Reports, CEDAW Country Reports, the annual Freedom in the World 
report by Freedom House, and Amnesty International’s Country Profiles. These sources 
are a mix of NGO and government reporting, including self-reporting to the CEDAW 
committee by the nations in the case study.  
 In the third chapter of this research project I will outline the qualities and 
standards I am judging each state on in relation to the eight rights. These standards will 
be based on the values outlined in CEDAW and feedback from the CEDAW Committee 
on how states are implementing the convention. Depending on the availability of data, I 
will seek to examine all eight rights in each of the case studies. 
 
Case Studies and Analysis 
The case selection process will involve three criteria.  Selected states must be a 
UN member, part of the Arab League, and capable of ratifying CEDAW on or before 
2003. The first qualification is necessary because only UN members can ratify CEDAW.  
The second qualification is based on trying to find a successful definition of what 
constitutes the Muslim world.  The MENA label is useful as a regional classification but 
also includes several non-Islamic states. The 22 Arab League states unify around a 
common language, Arabic, and shared faith, Islam. Additionally, not all Arab League 
members have signed CEDAW, which offers control data for the independent variable. 
 10 
Thus the Arab League is a better selection criteria for this research than the MENA 
region. Finally, the ability to sign CEDAW on or before 2003 guarantees states have had 
at least 10 years to implement reforms since ratification. Of the 22 Arab League states, 19 
meet all three criteria. 
When designing this research program I explored creating a quantitative analysis 
of the 19 states that meet the case selection criteria. However there is not enough publicly 
available data on the political and social rights of women in all 19 states. CEDAW 
specifies that member states are required to self-report the status of women’s rights in 
their country every 5 years to the CEDAW Committee if they have signed the 
convention. However an overwhelming majority of signatories have failed to fulfill this 
requirement, contributing to the lack of publicly available information. Sources outside of 
the UN, including the U.S. State Department’s annual Human Rights Report and data 
from NGOs such as Freedom House are the most in depth information available on the 
status of women’s rights in the 19 states, but often are more descriptive than data driven. 
These reports also are not always published for each state in regular intervals, with much 
data only becoming available in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, a qualitative case 
study approach is the best solution for examining H1 and H2. 
To choose the five case studies I examined how the 22 members of the Arab 
League fulfill the case selection criteria in Table 2. 
Table 2 





1 Algeria 1962 1 1996 
2 Bahrain 1971 1 2002 
3 Comoros 1975 1 1994 
4 Djibouti 1977 1 1988 
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5 Egypt 1945 1 1981 
6 Iraq 1945 1 1986 
7 Jordan 1955 1 1992 
8 Kuwait 1963 1 1994 
9 Lebanon 1945 1 1997 
10 Libya 1955 1 1989 
11 Morocco 1956 1 1993 
12 Mauritania 1961 1 2001 
13 Oman 1971 1 2006 
14 Palestine 
not a UN 
member N/A N/A 
15 Qatar 1971 1 2009 
16 Saudi Arabia 1945 1 2000 
17 Somalia 1960 0 N/A 
18 Sudan 1956 0 N/A 
19 Syria 1945 1 2003 
20 Tunisia 1956 1 1985 
21 
United Arab 
Emirates 1971 1 2004 
22 Yemen 1947 1 1984 
 
Based on preliminary research done for the creation of this thesis proposal I have 
selected Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia for the four case studies that will 
examine the success of CEDAW in Muslim countries and remaining challenges. These 
selected cases include states that did and did not have stated objections to Article 2, 
allowing for an analysis of H1. For example, Saudi Arabia agreed to Article 2 as long as 
it did not interfere with shari’a law, while Jordan did not have a stated objections to 
Article 2. 
The first case study will be Sudan. It is included as a case study because it did not 
ratify CEDAW and will act as a control for this research project. Sudan is one of the 
largest countries in Africa and has undergoing two violent civil wars in recent history. It 
also contains extremely varied levels of political and social freedom for women. Sudan is 
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frequently being ranked at the bottom of human rights indexes by groups like Freedom 
House but also has a higher rate of women in its national parliament than many Western 
states. Female genital mutilation and low female labor participation are also major 
problems within the state. 
Morocco has been selected as the second case study because it has seen 
improvement in women’s political participation in parliament and changes to marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance laws since ratifying CEDAW. This reform occurred in the early 
2000s and mainly took place through changes to the national constitution and family 
laws, or moudawana.
3
  Moroccan women’s groups worked with transnational advocacy 
organizations to push for the reform, some of which was rooted in Morocco’s ratification 
of CEDAW. This legislative approach to reform is a potential model for change in other 
Muslim states. 
Jordan is included in the case study analysis because it contains interesting 
contradictions in access to social and political rights for women. As a parliamentary 
monarchy Jordan allows women to vote and hold political office. Since the early 2000s 
women have had an increased presence in parliament, in part because of a newly adopted 
gender quota system.
4
 Conversely, several social rights of women in Jordan have grown 
worse in the 21
st
 century, with women lacking the right to maintain citizenship outside of 
marriage and increased reports of domestic violence.  
The final case study will be Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the frequent focus of 
international attention as an example of a state with extremely limited access to human 
                                                        
3
 Leila Hanafi, “Moudawana and Women’s Rights in Morocco: Balancing National and International Law,” 
ILSA Journal of  International & Comparative Law 18 (2012): 517. 
4
 Rana Husseini, Jordan, NGO, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress and 
Resistance (New York, NY: Freedom House, 2010), 
http://twww.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Jordan.pdf. 
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rights. Shari’a law is woven into the social and political laws of the country, requiring 
women to cover their hair and skin in public and the division of genders in public spaces, 
including schools. And while many states in the international community have rejected 
capital punishment or physical punishment, Saudi Arabia employs both, often publicly.
5
 
Of the five selected cases, Saudi Arabia has some of the least access to political and 
social rights, allowing for interesting comparison with the other four cases. 
  
Conclusion 
 The concluding chapter will focus on reviewing the major results of the analysis 
sections and testing the verifiability of my thesis. It will also be a space to review 
possible flaws in the study design and ways to correct them with further research. Finally, 
the conclusion will propose further questions for the study of CEDAW’s impact on 
Muslim women, including how to involve Islamic states more fully in the CEDAW 









                                                        
5
 Isobel Coleman, “The Payoff From Women’s Rights,” Foreign Affairs, June 2004, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59896/isobel-coleman/the-payoff-from-womens-rights. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This research project examines the success of international norms by studying 
how CEDAW has impacted women’s rights in Islamic countries. To understand this 
research question fully it is necessary to review the existing scholarship on the theory of 
international norm development, the role of international treaties in human rights, the 
implementation of CEDAW, and the effectiveness of CEDAW.  
 
International norm development  
International relations scholars have written at length about international norms, 
with the two major schools of thought taking separate sides. Realism argues that states in 
the international system operate using rational decision-making based solely on a state’s 
interests. Liberalism believes states operate using normative values and institutions to 
guide their actions and achieve collective goods. Finnemore and Sikkink define norms as 
single standards of behavior and institutions as the social structures that uphold normative 
values.
6
 Therefore, human rights treaties such as CEDAW are institutions that codify and 
uphold international norms about women’s rights.  
 Finnemore and Sikkink have written extensively on how norms develop in the 
international system. They theorize that norms have a “life-cycle” made up of three 
stages; norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.
7
  The first stage occurs when 
norm entrepreneurs, such as NGOs and transnational advocacy networks, push for a 
critical number of states to adopt a norm. This critical number of states can vary, but 
                                                        
6
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 891 
7
 Ibid., 895. 
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Finnemore and Sikkink suggest a tipping point is reached when at least 1/3 of states in 
the international system have adopted a norm.
8
 
The second stage, norm cascade, is carried out by the states participating in the 
norm. They use their influence to persuade other states to adopt the norm. Finnemore and 
Sikkink point to the 1997 international landmine treaty as proof of norm cascade. The 
third and final step in the life cycle of a norm is internalization, when a norm has become 
so integrated into states’ behaviors that the norm is no longer an issue of debate. One 
example of this is the rejection of slavery. While it still exists across the world through 




 Research on norm development became increasingly popular in the 1980s and 
1990s in the field of international relations, no doubt heightened by the growing number 
of human rights treaties passed by the UN. Nadelmann published research on which 
factors impact the success of an international norm becoming a “global prohibition 
regime,” meaning the norm is universally upheld. One of his key points is that a 
prohibited activity (i.e. a regime) only achieves international status when unilateral and 
bilateral attempts at preventing the regime have failed and the prohibited behavior crosses 
national borders. Examples include slavery and the illegal drug trade.
10
 
Nadelmann also argues that if a regime does not require significant resources or 
expert skill to engage in and is frequently underreported, then the bad behavior will 
flourish. Nadelmann gives examples of successful global prohibition regimes such as the 
                                                        
8
 Ibid., 901. 
9
 Ibid., 896–897. 
10
 Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,” 
International Organization 44, no. 4 (1990): 481–483. 
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anti-whaling movement. He also gives examples of failures such as the piracy of 
intellectual property in digital music and movies. 
11
 Using his logic, several of the 
regimes prohibited by CEDAW are easy to carry out undetected, such as domestic 
violence and sexual assault, making them less likely to become successful global 
prohibition regimes.  
 
The role of human rights treaties 
The development and enforcement of international norms often involves 
codifying the norm through an institution. The UN has been one of the most robust 
institutions for this codification process. Either the General Assembly of the UN or an 
appointed subcommittee will draft a legal document that member nations can sign to 
show they will uphold an international norm. Once signed states must also ratify the 
agreement through their domestic institutions, often by referendum or a vote in 
parliament. For international agreements regarding trade or security treaties often lay out 
in exacting detail how binding the agreement is, outlining reporting processes and 
penalties for noncompliance. However international human rights treaties are often 
written with broad language to encompass large normative values, making states hesitant 
to sign them if there is a robust enforcement mechanism or if the treaty many conflict 
with domestic politics. Because of this concern, almost no UN human rights treaties 
contain penalties for noncompliance. So why do states sign on to human rights 
agreements if they are ineffective at change? Moreover, why do human rights activists 
continue to support the creation of more treaties?  
                                                        
11
 Ibid., 525–526. 
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To answer this question Hathaway analyzed 160 countries that signed on to 3 core 
human rights agreements ; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and CEDAW. Hathaway’s research argues that states with few domestic, 
democratic institutions do not fear having to actually implement the values of a human 
rights agreement. Thus they are often willing to sign on because the “collateral 
consequences” of their ratification may lead to a better international reputation while not 
forcing the state to actual improve its human rights issues. 
12
 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 




While many scholars agree that states do not immediately change their human 
rights records once they have ratified a treaty, researchers do find some positive 
outcomes of the treaty process in establishing international norms. Hathaway’s research 
shows that states with a higher number of NGOs are more likely to see progress in human 
rights after ratification than those with fewer NGOs, even if the state lacks strong 
democratic institutions. Hathaway also points out the transnational impact of human 
rights conventions, such as the European Union’s requirement that any new member of 
the EU sign the European Convention on Human Rights.
14
  Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
suggest that although human rights treaties themselves most likely have no effect on the 
implementation of international norms, the existence of NGOs does lead to change and 
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Resolution 51, no. 4 (August 1, 2007): 590, doi:10.1177/0022002707303046. 
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the drafting and ratification process for human rights treaties strengthens the presence of 
NGOs on the state and international level.
15
   
 
Scholarship on the creation of CEDAW  
 Using this framework of how international norms are codified into human rights 
agreements we can now review the scholarship surrounding the creation of CEDAW. 
Chapter 3 will give an in-depth explanation of the drafting, signing, and ratification 
process for CEDAW. In this section we will examine how international relations scholars 
have viewed the implementation of CEDAW over the past 35 years. Then we will review 
the scholarship on CEDAW’s application in the Muslim world. 
 The most highly criticized pieces of CEDAW are the large number of reservations 
by states that have ratified the convention and the weak reporting procedure for when 
states violate the agreement.  Research by Neumayer on “the role of reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) in international treaties” makes the case that 
liberal democracies are the states that often have the most RUDs in place for human 
rights agreements because they intend to adhere to the agreement. However he explains 
that in the case of CEDAW Islamic states often employ “general clauses” that object to 
enforcing any measures in CEDAW that violate shari’a law. This kind of general 
reservation has only ever appeared in treaties regarding the rights of women and children 
and he attributes it to the cultural differences in Western and Islamic states.
16
 In response 
to this argument authors like Zwingel have pointed out that during the drafting process of 
CEDAW Islamic states such as Morocco objected that the convention was heavily 
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 Eric Neumayer, “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights 
Treaties,” The Journal of Legal Studies 36, no. 2 (June 2007): 407–408, doi:10.1086/511894. 
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influenced by Western ideas of women’s rights and use reservations as a way to protect 
themselves and their domestic politics from CEDAW’s influence.
17
 
 Afsharipour explains the criticism surrounding the reporting mechanism of 
CEDAW. Under Article 29 of the convention a state can lodge a complaint against 
another state for violating the agreement. The two states have 6 months to solve the 
dispute between themselves, and then the CEDAW Committee can refer the matter to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for resolution. However many CEDAW signatories 




 While some human rights treaties allow for individuals to petition the UN or the 
treaty bodies over violations by their home states, CEDAW had no such mechanism 
when it was created. In response to criticism, in 2000 the CEDAW Committee added the 
Optional Protocol, which allows individuals from states that have ratified CEDAW and 
the new Optional Protocol to submit complaints. Yet very few state parties of CEDAW 
have ratified the Optional Protocol amendment.
19
 
 The other reporting mechanism in CEDAW is a process of self-reporting by state 
parties to the CEDAW Committee. Within one year of ratifying the convention a state 
must submit a report on the status of women’s rights in its borders to the Committee. 
States must then submit subsequent follow up reports every four years. However, over 
2/3 of signatories have been late in submitting reports and many only submitted an initial 
report and then one or two follow ups. Additionally, unlike other human rights bodies at 
                                                        
17 Susanne Zwingel, “From Intergovernmental Negotiations to (sub)national Change.,” International 
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 20 
the UN that have standing offices in Geneva, the CEDAW Committee has bi-annual 
meetings in New York and often runs out of time to review reports and engage in 




General Impact of CEDAW 
In the face of this heavy criticism of CEDAW some scholars have still found 
positive outcomes from the implementation of the convention. In their 1998 book 
Activists Beyond Borders Keck and Sikkink explain how transnational advocacy 
networks can utilize a boomerang effect if they cannot establish a norm on the domestic 
level. NGOs and advocacy groups in states will push their issues into the international 
dialogue, forcing their national leaders to embrace a norm from the top down rather than 
from the bottom up.
21
   
Afsharipour argues this boomerang effect is playing out with CEDAW in some 
states that have ratified the convention. Afsharipour uses Bangladesh as a case study of a 
nation with weak domestic institutions, stated reservations to the convention, and a poor 
history on women’s rights. After ratifying CEDAW in 1984 Bangladesh submitted its 
first report in 1992 to the Committee. With no official government agency to pull 
together the report, the first report ended up being a short, poorly researched document 
and only touched on 1 of the 16 rights CEDAW covers. Women’s groups in Bangladesh 
used the criticism the report received from the Committee and international momentum 
from the 1995 Beijing Conference to convince their national government to let them help 
draft the next report. The government agreed and also setup a Department of Women’s 
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Affairs to assist them. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw improvement in Bangladesh 
on women’s labor rights and political participation, change that Afsharipour attributes to 
the Bangladeshi women’s rights groups. 
22
 
A 2013 article by Cole analyzed 177 countries that ratified CEDAW. Cole 
assessed CEDAW’s impact on political, economic, and cultural rights in those 177 states. 
He found that states that had ratified CEDAW saw a steady growth in women’s 
participation in parliament in the subsequent years after ratification. However the same 
states did not see an increase in the requirement of quotas for female participation in 
government offices. Cole theorizes that this means state practices were changing even if 
formal policy did not.
23
 This is a modification on the boomerang effect, for although state 
policy did not change, behavior within the state did because of top-down pressure. 
Another finding from Cole’s research was that Arab countries saw little to no impact on 
women’s rights by ratifying CEDAW. Cole argues that this failure is mainly due to the 
religious values of Islam, a claim that he does not explore deeply in his paper.     
 
Impact of CEDAW on Muslim Women 
Cole is not alone in his critique of Islam’s influence on the effectiveness of 
CEDAW. One of the reasons for the focus on Arab states is the size and high needs of the 
Muslim population.  Over 300 million people live in the MENA region and about 23% of 
them live on less than $2 a day. 
24
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Cheriff examines the progress of women’s rights in Islamic countries in a 2010 
article. Cheriff outlines the three most common cultural explanations for why women in 
Islamic countries have not gained gender equality under CEDAW. The first explanation 
argues that that “in Muslim countries a state’s policies are dictated by Islamic law.”
25
  
This perspective assumes that Islamic states operate almost entirely as theocracies, where 
the religious values are at the root of all rights and laws. The second explanation states 
that Islamic nations used religion as a way to consolidate power during the establishment 
of their governments. Because of this, state institutions internalized the patriarchal values 
of Islam and subsequently women were subject to those values under the law. The 
cultural third explanation is that while a government itself may not be Islamic, state 
leaders and elites require the support of religious leaders. So politicians uphold Islamic 




Scholars such as Arzt and Nadelmann support similar cultural explanations for 
why Muslim women have not benefited greatly from the ratification of CEDAW.  Arzt 
explores the jurisprudence of shari’a law, explaining that it is based in the Quran, the 
Sunna, and the consensus of Islamic scholars, called ijma.
27
 At least 17 states in the 
MENA region identify as Islamic and others refer to shari’a law in their constitutions. 
But Arzt explains that many former Ottoman nations reformed their laws to be mainly 
based in civil code in an attempt to modernize as they increased their trade and 
interaction with the West after World War II. Where he sees the main conflict between 
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shari’a and Western ideas of law is the concept of individual rights. He explains that 
Enlightenment thinkers like Locke and Rousseau believed individual freedom was the 
root of state power, and their ideas heavily influence Western jurisprudence. Islamic law 
does the opposite, believing that individuals are meant to be part of the community and 
that the only inalienable rights belong to God. So there is a philosophical disconnect 
between Western values of human rights and Islamic beliefs about community and God 
as the root of state power.
28
 
However recent research has pushed back on these cultural assumptions and 
instead sought economic and political reasons for why CEDAW has not improved 
women’s rights in Islamic states. 
Cheriff’s research focuses on examining Muslim women’s citizenship and 
inheritance rights as a means of assessing normative change. From her analysis of 37 
countries Cheriff finds that women’s limited access to education and employment 
opportunities have a bigger impact on their rights than living in a Muslim state. She uses 
quantitative analysis and a case study between India and Pakistan to demonstrate her 
findings. As she explains ““India has a .68 probability of nondiscrimination, and Pakistan 
a mere 0.13” around nationality rights but if Pakistan’s number of women in the 
workforce mirrored India’s numbers its probability would rise to .19. And if women in 
Pakistan constituted half the labor force its probability of no discrimination would rise to 
.40.
29
 . She argues that education and labor participation are the “core rights” which allow 
for other areas of women’s rights to progress and must be studied as such. She gives 
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examples such as the average age of marriage rising and lower fertility rates in states with 
higher female education and more women working in the labor force.
30
  
A second rebuttal to cultural explanations comes from Ross. He argues that  in 
fact it is Arab states’ dependence on oil wealth which keeps women out of the work 
force, which in turn prevents them from gaining political power and achieving social and 
cultural rights. He suggests that women have been able to increase their labor 
opportunities in history through “the development of low-wage export-oriented 
industries, especially in textiles, garments, and processed agricultural goods.” 
31
 He gives 
the case study of South Korea, which industrialized in the 1970s, with women taking the 
factory jobs for exported goods. By the 1970s, women in the factories had begun 
organizing around labor rights and for more political power in the legislature and courts. 
By the 1990s, women in South Korea had pushed forward several laws in their favor, 




States that demonstrate Ross’ theory include “Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Oman.” These states are oil rich but have seen the least progress on 
women’s suffrage and have the lowest number of women in political office. 
Conversely states with little to no oil wealth like “Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Djibouti” each adopted women’s suffrage earlier than other Arab states and have the 
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most women holding political office.
33





How this New Research Adds to the Field 
 The scholarship above lays out a case for the adoption of norms through human 
rights treaties but does not offer clear explanations for why Islamic states are outliers in 
this process. Authors like Cole, Cheriff, and Ross offer suggestions rooted in religious 
differences and economic and educational disparities. This research project seeks to 
robustly test these theories. If Cole’s assumption about Islam is right then women in 
Islamic states should not have seen their rights change since the adoption of CEDAW by 
their home states. But if Cheriff and Ross’ suggestions about the role of education and 
economic opportunities hold true then CEDAW may have led to some progress for 
Muslim women.  
 The second area where this research project will explore new ground is the 
difference between social and political rights being achieved through international human 
rights treaties. As Nadelmann explained, banning a regime rests on several factors, 
including the likelihood of the regime to cross state boundaries and the likelihood for it to 
be underreported. Political rights often are a domestic matter, but international systems 
like the United Nations allow other nations to see and examine the political practices of 
all members states. And while institutions such as elections often codify political rights, 
social rights are less formerly regulated, for example how marriage is governed by a 
church or domestic disputes handled within a family. By identifying and analyzing the 
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social and political rights of CEDAW this research program tests the effectiveness of 
human rights treaties in disseminating different kinds of rights.  
 Now that we have examined the existing scholarship on international norms, 
CEDAW, and women’s rights in Muslim states we can move on to a comprehensive 





































Chapter 3: Overview of CEDAW 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the founding document that 
defines the inalienable, individual rights of all people. Since its adoption by the United 
Nations in 1948, protecting human rights has become a core value of international law. 
Dozens of declarations and conventions on human rights have been enacted, but only one 
has been passed which directly addresses gender. The Convention to End All 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the only human rights treaty that 
specifically outlines the rights of women. Article 1 of CEDAW clearly defines 
discrimination against women as the following: 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 




Articles 6 through 17 list specific forms of this discrimination, creating a 
framework which states can be held accountable to. The UN General Assembly (GA) 
adopted CEDAW in 1979. Ratification followed swiftly and CEDAW is currently the 2
nd
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Creation of CEDAW 
In 1946 the GA established the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) as a 
sub commission of the Commission on Human Rights.  From 1949 to 1959, the CSW 
created several important conventions that addresses specific rights and issues. These 
included the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), the Convention on the 
Nationality of Married Women (1957), the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962), and the 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages (1965).
37
 While these documents offered specific protections, there was still 
no overarching standard that defined what constitutes discrimination against women. 
Without a framework, injustices could not be brought to light under international law. 
Thus, in 1963 the GA adopted resolution 1921, which asked the CSW to prepare a draft 
declaration outlining the human rights of women. After several years of drafting and 
revisions by the CSW, on November 7, 1967 the GA adopted the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
38
 
 While the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was a 
success in that it outlined what constituted discrimination and listed specific rights to be 
protected, the document was non-binding. At the 1975 1
st
 World Conference of the 
International Women's Year in Mexico City several UN member states and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) called for the creation of a binding treaty that 
addressed women’s rights. In 1976 the GA asked a working group within the CSW to 
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create the text of a new binding treaty - the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 





The working group drafted and revised CEDAW’s language from 1977—1979. 
The convention consists of several articles. Article 1 defines discrimination against 
women. Articles 2-4 lay out administrative and legal ground for the treaty. Article 5 asks 
state parties to the treaty to reject historic or traditional discrimination against women in 
their societies. Articles 6-17 address individual rights and areas of discrimination such as 
prostitution, sexual assault, work discrimination, property rights, citizenship, voting, and 
reproductive health.
40
 The revision process was informed by members of the CSW and 
received comments from NGOs from across the world. 
There were some issues left out of the text of CEDAW. Violence against women 
is not listed or defined as a form of discrimination in any of the articles. CEDAW also 
makes no mention of abortion care, instead allowing states to determine their own 
policies on the issue.  Several requests for a formal complaint and enforcement procedure 
were made during the drafting process but neither piece was added in. The most 
significant enforcement mechanism is Article 29 which says that when states disagree 
over the “the interpretation or application” of CEDAW, they have 6 months to settle by 
negotiation, and then the issue will be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
41
  By 1979, a final draft was agreed upon and the GA adopted CEDAW under 





 Evatt, “Finding a Voice for Women’s Rights,” 517. 
41
 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, 1979, 9, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx. 
 30 
Resolution 34/180 by a vote of 130 to none, with 10 abstentions. The final version of 
CEDAW was presented publicly for the first time at the 1980 Copenhagen World 
Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace.  
 
Ratification 
 After being approved by the GA, the next step for CEDAW was ratification by 
UN member states. CEDAW was designed to take effect once 20 states had ratified the 
convention. This happened quickly and the convention came into force in 1981. Within 
10 years of its passage, 110 states ratified CEDAW. As of 2015, 189 states have ratified 




The Committee  
Article 17 of CEDAW establishes the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (Committee). The Committee is made up of 23 
independent experts who monitor the implementation of CEDAW. Each state that is party 
to CEDAW is allowed to nominate one expert to the Committee, and then the list of 
nominees is voted upon by all CEDAW member states. If elected, experts serve 4-year 
terms. The Committee is led by one Chairperson, three Vice Chairpersons, and a 
rapporteur, all who are elected by Committee members.  
One year after ratifying CEDAW, a state must submit a report on the status of its 
compliance with the convention to the Committee. After that initial report, states must 
submit a report updating the Committee on their compliance every four years. The 
Committee reviews the reports and makes recommendations to the states on how to 
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improve the treatment of women and comply with the convention. These 
recommendations are non-binding because there are no penalties for non-compliance 
written into the convention. The Committee also reports once a year to the UN through 
the Economic and Social Council.
43
 The first session of the Committee met in 1982. The 
Committee was initially under the UN Division for the Advancement of Women. But in 
2008, it was moved to the jurisdiction of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 





UN member states were allowed to ratify CEDAW while also submitting formal 
reservations to pieces of the convention. These reservations allow the states to remove 
themselves from certain parts of the agreement. According to the Vienna Convention on 




However, over 70 of the 189 states that ratified CEDAW have entered 
reservations against at least one Article of the convention. 
46
 And several of these 
reservations violate the Vienna Convention. For example, Article 2 requires states to 
“take all appropriate measures” to implement CEDAW but Malaysia submitted a 
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reservation against Article 2. Malaysia ratified CEDAW but its reservation allows it to 
not fulfill the standards set by the convention.
47
 
In other cases, states felt CEDAW interfered with customary or religious law. For 
example, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia all entered 
reservations against women’s protection from forced marriage, right to citizenship, right 
to inheritance, and right to divorce. In the language of their reservations the states 




Finally, 40 states submitted reservations because of concerns that CEDAW would 
interfere with state sovereignty. Article 29 of CEDAW refers disputes between states 
over the interpretation of CEDAW to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
49
 But many 
UN member states do not want to fall under the jurisdiction of the ICJ and entered 
reservations against Article 29, effectively undermining the only enforcement mechanism 
in the original convention. And out of a similar concern for sovereignty, the United States 
is the only state that has signed but not ratified CEDAW. President Jimmy Carter signed 





In the 1990s, a movement to add complaint and enforcement mechanisms 
resurfaced, in part because of the large number of reservations submitted by states that 
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had ratified the convention. In 1994, a group of independent experts, CEDAW members, 
NGOs, and advocates met at the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights to create a process 
for enforcing CEDAW. The CSW established another working group to take on the draft 
that emerged from the Maastricht Centre meeting. By 1999, the draft was finalized into 
the Optional Protocol, a stand-alone treaty that can only be signed by states that have 
ratified CEDAW. The Optional Protocol took effect in December of 2000 and 106 states 
have signed on as of 2015 .
51
 
 The Optional Protocol allows groups and individuals to approach the Committee 
with complaints about states violating CEDAW. This occurs through the communications 
procedure. When the Committee decides to investigate the claim this is called the inquiry 
procedure. Investigations end with a report by the Committee on the validity of the 
complaint and recommendations for how to end the CEDAW violation. To date, the 
Committee has gone through 11 communication procedures and one inquiry procedure.
52
 
However there is no formal penalty or consequence of states who are investigated and 
they are not bound to comply with the Committee’s recommendations. 
 
Successful Outcomes of CEDAW 
 In the 35 years since it came into force, there have been several significant steps 
forward in ending discrimination against women that can be directly linked to CEDAW 
and the Committee. One such area is violence against women. As mentioned previously, 
CEDAW does not define violence against women as a form of discrimination. However 
several years after CEDAW was ratified the Committee made a general recommendation 
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in 1989 that set a precedent of commenting on rates of violence against women in all the 
member states who sent in reports.
53
  This opened the door to the submission of 
communications procedures involving violence against women. 
In 2002, two NGOS, Equality Now and Casa Amiga, submitted a complaint to 
CEDAW about the abduction, rape, and murder of women in the city Ciudad Juárez in 
the state of Chihuahua, Mexico.  Chihuahua shares a border with the U.S. and has a 
population of 1.5 million. It has a large manufacturing sector where women often migrate 
to the city to work in the maquilas, or factories. 
54
 The CEDAW Committee’s 2004 
inquiry revealed that the maquilas and illicit drug trade placed women, especially 
younger women, in dangerous conditions at the hands of factory management and local 
drug runners. Law enforcement in the city did little to investigate reports of sexual assault 
and disappearance, even going as far as failing to investigate the murders of several 
dozen women in the late 1990s. The Committee’s inquiry report on violence against 
women in Ciudad Juárez led to the 2007 passage of the Mexican General Law on 
Women’s Access to a Life Free from Violence, leading to country-wide reform in the 
handling of rape, abductions, and murder cases of Mexican women. 
55
 
CEDAW has also been invoked in the domestic courts of states party to the 
convention, such as a 2001 rape case in Tanzania where a woman was raped as a method 
of being forced to marry her rapist. The Tanzanian court reinforced Article 16 of 
CEDAW, which prohibits forced marriage, and upheld the rape conviction.
56
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In the 1984 case Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, the High Court of Zambia 
upheld that the Intercontinental Hotel was guilty of workplace discrimination because it 
refused to let women enter the main lobby without a male escort. The High Court cited 
CEDAW Articles 1,2, and 3 as justification for its ruling.
57
 
Women in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were left out of recent land reform 
programs and advocacy groups in both countries invoked CEDAW’s Article 16 to get the 
government to create legal support systems for women so they would know their rights 
and be able to take advantage of buying and owning newly available land. 
58
 
Egypt, which signed CEDAW but with reservations against Article 9, removed its 
reservations in 2009 and amended its constitution to allow nationality of women and girls 




Remaining Challenges for CEDAW 
While some CEDAW signatories such as the Netherlands and Nepal have used 
CEDAW to create stronger domestic laws against sex trafficking, other states have 
continued to ignore the growing problems of prostitution and sex trafficking. In its 2012 
Trafficking of Persons Report the U.S. State Department identified that women and girls 
are 98% of sex trafficking victims. The report also cited research from UN, which 
identified East Asia as the largest source of trafficking victims.
60
 Almost all the states in 










Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, Trafficking in Persons Report 




that region have ratified CEDAW, with several even passing anti-trafficking laws. The 
space between the law and enforcement remains too wide and must be bridged. 
Accessing reproductive health services, including birth control and abortion, also 
remains a challenge for women. In Article 12 of CEDAW women are guaranteed access 
to healthcare, including family planning and prenatal care. However several states 
entered reservations against Article 12 on the basis that it conflicted with religious values. 
Additionally, abortion is not mentioned in CEDAW so efforts by states to reduce abortion 




Examining the creation, drafting, ratification, and implementation of CEDAW has 
revealed several conclusions about the outcomes of the convention in the last 35 years. It 
remains the most comprehensive human rights treaty on the rights of women and has 
been ratified by almost all UN member states. The Committee has established a reporting 
process that allows for critique of ongoing discrimination. However the extensive number 
of reservations and the lack of an enforcement mechanism aim to prevent CEDAW from 
creating on the ground change in many states. Rather, CEDAW can be used as a tool by 
activists and advocacy networks to hold states accountable to their citizens.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology and Evaluation of Rights 
This chapter will lay out the process for testing H1 and H2 in each of the five case 
studies. First we will identify the sources of information for the case studies and then 
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break down the evaluation process for the eight identified political and social rights of 
women within CEDAW. By defining standards for evaluation we will be able to show the 
change in rights within individual states and compare progress between different case 
studies. 
 
Information and Data Sources 
Human rights reporting has changed significantly over the past several decades, 
especially as the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has increased. As 
Keck and Sikkink posit in Activists Beyond Borders, one of the key roles of transnational 
advocacy networks is to disseminate information on state behavior.61 To gather 
information on the change in women’s rights since the passage of CEDAW we will use 
both government and NGO sources, with the goal of gathering unbiased information as 
well as understanding states’ ability to accurately represent the status of women within 
their borders. 
 The first information source we shall use when evaluating a case study will be any 
reports the nation has submitted to the CEDAW Committee. Under Article 18 of the 
convention, within one year of ratifying CEDAW a state must submit a report to the 
Committee on “the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have 
adopted” to enforce the rights outlined in the convention. States states must then continue 
submitting progress reports to the Committee every four years.62 The limitation on this 
source of information is that almost all states that have ratified CEDAW have fallen 
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behind on the regular reporting process. And Sudan, one of our case studies, is not party 
to the treaty and thus does not have any reports to evaluate. However, even with these 
limitations the CEDAW reports will provide useful information on how countries 
evaluate their progress in implementing the convention. 
 The second information source this research program will use is the annual U.S. 
State Department Human Rights Reports. In 1971 the U.S. Congress created the 
Coordinator of Human Rights in the State Department, formalizing the evaluation of 
human rights as part of America’s foreign policy. Beginning in 1977, the State 
Department began submitting to Congress annual reports on the status of human rights in 
countries that received U.S. foreign aid. In 1994 the State Department expanded and 
redefined its human rights branch and in 1999 it began releasing annual reports on the 
status of human rights across the world.63 The annual Human Rights Report is a valuable 
source of information because it is one of the most comprehensive government reporting 
processes in the world and it contains both regional and state specific updates.   
 The third source of information will come from the NGO Freedom House. 
Founded in 1941, Freedom House is one of the oldest, most well respected NGOs 
working to promote transparency in government and freedom of speech. It began 
releasing reports on the status of political rights and civil liberties in the 1970s, 
formalizing this process into its annual Freedom in the World report in 1998. The most 
recent report, published in 2015, evaluated 195 countries. Nations are assigned a score 
from 1 to 7 for their political rights and civil liberties with “1 representing the greatest 
degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom.” Based on the average of their 
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political and civil scores, countries are then ranked as “Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.”64 
The rights examined by Freedom House correspond to the core values outlined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 Freedom House’s annual reports will be supplemented by the NGO’s 2005 and 
2010 reports entitled Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa. These two 
reports dig deeper into the specific rights outlined in CEDAW. And because of the lack 
of timely reporting by state parties to the CEDAW Committee, these two reports by 
Freedom House will supplement information on changes in the past 10 years to women’s 
rights in Islamic states that is not possible to ascertain from states’ self reporting. 
 
Standards for evaluating rights 
Evaluation of each case study will begin with a review of when the country 
ratified CEDAW and any stated reservations the nation made against the convention. In 
particular, to test H1 we will note if the state had a reservation to Article 2.  
 Next, we will evaluate the change in the four political rights since the ratification 
of CEDAW by the country. Each of the four rights will be evaluated and ranked as being 
fully, partially, or not achieved. The following table outlines how we will define each 
political right along these three categories: 
 
Table 3 
 Fully Achieved Partially Achieved Not Achieved 
The right to 
vote 
Women can legally 
vote and are able to do 
so without fear of 
Legally women are 
allowed to vote but 
threats to their safety 
Women are not 
allowed to legally 
vote.  
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violence.   prevent full 
enfranchisement. 
The right to 
hold office. 
Women can legally 
hold any public, 
elected office and 
female candidates 
have been able to run 
without violence or 
intimidation. 
Women can legally hold 
public office but are 
limited to certain roles 
or risk violence if they 
actually run for a 
position. 
Women cannot 
legally be elected to 
public office. 
The right to 
citizenship 
Women have full 
rights to citizenship 
regardless of marital 
status and can pass 
their citizenship on to 
their children 
Women have some right 
to citizenship but can 
lose those rights based 
on marriage, divorce, or 
custody of children 
issues. 
Women do not have 
a right to citizenship 
as individuals. 
The right to 
own property 
Women can inherent, 
purchase, own, and 
sell private property. 
Women can own 
property but are limited 
in how they inherit, 




   
 These rankings are based on the evaluation process used by both Freedom House 
and by the U.S. State Department in their annual review of political and civil rights. If a 
state does not clearly fall into fully, partially, or not achieving a specific political right we 
will take time within the case study to explore the status of the right in more detail and 
evaluate why it falls outside of these three classifications.  
 Once we have evaluated the political rights of a country we will move on to 
evaluating the four social rights for that case study. Each of the four social rights will be 
evaluated and ranked as being fully, partially, or not achieved. The following table 
outlines how we will define each social right along these three categories: 
 
Table 4 
 Fully Achieved Partially Achieved Not Achieved 
The right to 
education 
Women can access 
free, public education 
Women have some 
access to free education. 
Women are not 




There may be limits on 
what they can learn, or 
they may not be 
allowed to pursue 
higher education. 
school or are highly 
restricted to what 
they can learn. 
The right to 
contraception 
Women are legally 
allowed to use 
contraception for 
family planning. 
Women are allowed to 
use contraception for 
family planning but 
with restrictions 
depending on their 
marital status. 
It is illegal for 
women to use 
contraception. 
The right to 
employment 
Women are legally 
allowed to work 
outside of the home 
without restrictions. 
Women can legally 
work outside of the 
home but with 
restrictions on what 
type of job or are not 
paid equally for their 
work. 
Women cannot 
work legally outside 
of the home. 
The right to 
marry 
Women can legally 
marry and divorce at 
will, and without fear 
of violence. 
Women can legally 
marry with limits, such 
as not being allowed to 
divorce or losing 
custody of children after 
a divorce. 
Women cannot 
choose to marry or 
divorce of their own 
will.  
 
Once again, these rankings are also based on the evaluation process used by both 
Freedom House and by the U.S. State Department in their assessment of political and 
civil rights. If a state does not clearly fall into fully, partially, or not achieving a specific 
social right we will take time within the case study to explore the status of the right in 
more detail and evaluate why it falls outside of these common classifications. Given the 
more common influence of shari’a law in social rights rather than political rights in 
Islamic states, this section of case studies may need more in-depth analysis than the 
sections on political rights.  
Chapter 5: Sudan 
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A former British protectorate, Sudan gained its independence in 1956 but has 
been trapped in a cycle of civil wars for most of its independence. Much of the fighting 
has been between a Christian and Sub-Saharan African south against an Islamic and 
Muslim north, but the conflict has evolved to also include issues around pro-democracy 
groups, tribal histories, and the influence of oil wealth in the country. The southern part 
of the country has acted with significant autonomy since 1972 but the second half of the 
20
th
 century saw ongoing attempts by the government in Khartoum to unify the country 
by oppressing those living in Sudan’s southern region.
65
 
The most recent military coup took place in 1989 by the National Salvation 
Revolution Command Council (RCC). The RCC and its leader, Lieutenant General Omar 
Hassan Al-Bashir, suspended the constitution, disbanded all political parties and 
suppressed freedom of expression. By 1993, the RCC was dissolved as well and Bashir 
was appointed as President. He won a highly corrupt national election in 1996, and put in 
place a new constitution in 1998. At the same time, the country’s parliament, the National 
Assembly, selected Dr. Hassan al-Turabi as its Speaker. Turabi became the leader of the 
National Congress party and began to speak out against President Bashir. Turabi aligned 
himself with Islamic fundamentalist groups to consolidate power. In 2000, Bashir 
declared a state of emergency, dismissing parliament and jailing Turabi under suspicion 
that he was plotting to overthrow the president.
66
 
 The early 2000s saw a steady increase in conflict between Bashir’s government 
and rebel groups in the South. While al-Turabi remained imprisoned until 2003 and 
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President Bashir worked to improve Sudan’s international image, rebel groups in the 
South began to form to resist Bashir’s government. As Freedom House explained in a 
2006 report “the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), representing black farmers and villagers in Darfur, attacked Sudanese military 
garrisons in the region” in the early 2000s.
67
 In response, President Bashir sent 
government backed militias, known as janjaweed, to suppress the Southern uprising. 
Villages were burned, crops destroyed, and the United Nations estimates that anywhere 
between 70,000 and 400,000 people were killed and 2 million were displaced. The 
conflict bled into neighboring states like Chad as refugees fled Sudan, and the United 
States labeled the conflict genocide.
68
 
 By 2005, the international community had intervened to stop the violence and 
find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Both African Union and UN troops were placed in 
the region and a peace deal was brokered between the southern groups and President 
Bashir’s government. While violence by the government itself slowed after the peace 
negotiations, the conflict in southern Sudan continued. In 2011, a referendum was held in 
South Sudan, according to the Comprehensive Peace agreement signed in 2005, allowing 
South Sudan to separate and become an independent nation. The referendum passed and 
in 2011 it became a sovereign nation. At least a dozen groups are attempting to either rule 
the new country or are in war with the young government of South Sudan. President 
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Bashir remains in power in Sudan and has made limited attempts at political reform, 
though his 2015 reelection was widely criticized for its lack of transparency.
69
 
 This case study analyzes the change in women’s rights in Sudan and does not 
explore the changes in South Sudan. Because of South Sudan’s rather recent 
independence there is not enough data available to assess the change in women’s rights in 
South Sudan. However there is enough publicly available date to analyze the changes in 
women’s rights in the northern state of Sudan. 
 
Ratification & Reservations 
Sudan is not a party to CEDAW, one of only a handful of UN members who have 
not signed or ratified the treaty.
70
 President Bashir refused to sign the convention in 2001, 
stating that it "contradicted Sudanese values and traditions."
71
 This language is similar to 
the general reservations against Article 2 that other Islamic states have used. 
Analyzing the progress of women’s rights in Sudan will give us a control group 
for our research project, allowing us to see how Islamic states have furthered women’s 
rights without the aid of international treaties like CEDAW. Sources for this analysis will 
remain the same as with previous case studies, with the exception of CEDAW reports 
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Political Rights 
Women are allowed to vote in Sudan, but the frequent suspension of parliament has 
led to very few elections. The most recent elections were in 2010 and 2015. International 




Progress has been made on a woman’s right to hold public office in Sudan. For many 
years the National Assembly had very few female candidates. However, a 2008 reform 
created a quota, guaranteeing that women will hold 25% of seats parliament.
73
  As a 
result of this quota, women’s participation in government began to improve. As the U.S. 
State Department explains, in 2009 there were “70 women in the 450-seat National 
Assembly, three national female state ministers, and one female minister in the GNU.”
74
 
By 2013, women held 87 seats in parliament, 30 women served as state ministers and 6 of 
the 56 cabinet positions went to women.
75
 
A woman’s right to citizenship in Sudan is one of the more limited political rights. 
Women are considered citizens but it is unclear how much control their male relatives 
have over their ability to use their citizenship rights. Women cannot travel abroad without 
permission of their husbands or male relatives, though this practice is more strictly 
enforced in the north rather than in the south.
76
 Other issues, such as transferring 
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citizenship to children or losing status after a divorce varies within regions inside of 
Sudan, often depending on the level of adherence to shari’a law by that region’s local 
councils. 
The word political right includes a woman’s ability to own property. In Sudan, 
women can own property but a widow can only inherit 1/8 of her husband’s property and 
a daughter can only inherit 1/3.
77
 This means that transferring property between family 
members heavily favors men. And as we will see below, women’s limited educational 
and economic opportunities make purchasing property extremely difficult. 
 
Social Rights 
We will begin examining social rights by look at a woman’s right to education. 
The state controls public universities, including setting curriculum which can lead to 
biased information in subjects from history to the natural sciences. Women are allowed to 
attend school but there is no requirement for free or public education on even the primary 
school level. Students are frequently harassed, most recently during the 2011 Arab Spring, 




In particular, female students are harassed for not upholding modest standards of 
dress according to certain interpretations of shari’a law. These crimes of “indecency” 
have outrageous punishments from up to one year in prison or as many as 40 lashes.
79
 In 
1999, police flogged nine female students for “obscene acts” because they girls were 
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 One of the few positive notes around female education is that over ½ the 
professors at Khartoum University were women in 2008.
81
 This follows a trend seen in 
our other case studies of women being able to work in education because it allows for 
separation of the genders.  
Moving on to the next social right, contraception is legal for married women in 
Sudan.  However access and use of birth control remains limited. According to the UN 
Population Division, only 12% of women and girls between the ages of 15-49 used 
contraception in 2012.
82
 Reasons for this low use include lack of access to healthcare, 
especially in rural areas and ongoing civil wars that have led to higher incidents of sexual 
violence.  
With limited access to education and family planning services, women in Sudan 
rarely work outside of the home. Moreover, many women and children have been 
abducted and forced into domestic servitude and prostitution through the civil wars. As 
the U.S. State department reported in 2003, “In the last approximately 15 years, an 
estimated 15,000 Dinka women and children have been abducted.”
83
 This one statistic 
barely represents the thousands of women and girls who have been captured during the 
conflict. However verifiable data is very limited because of the ongoing violence in South 
Sudan. NGOs and the U.S. State Department also do not have information on how many 
women are active in the formal labor market, which indicates extremely limited 
participation. 
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The most severely limited social right is a woman’s right to marriage. In Sudan, 
shari’a law dictates marriage and divorce, meaning women have “very little autonomy or 
rights with regard to marital status.”
84
 For a marriage to be legal a woman must have a 
male relative’s permission and there are no formal rights for a woman to apply for 
divorce. Domestic violence is not against the law and female genital mutilation is still a 
widespread practice. Throughout the 2000s, rape was used by the military and the 
janjaweed as a tool of war. In July of 2005, Doctors Without Borders testified that at least 
500 rapes took place over a four and half month period in Darfur by police, military, and 
militia forces.
85
 Add to this that in Sudan a woman needs 4 male witnesses to verify a 
rape and unmarried, pregnant women are subject to adultery and indecency charges that 
carry prison time and physical punishment.
86
 All of these factors compounded together 




Sudan is a sharp contrast against the other four case studies when evaluating the 
progress in women’s political and social rights. In addition to not being a CEDAW 
signatory, Sudan has also undergone dozens of years of civil conflict. Both these factors 
have led women to have limited political rights and almost no social rights. The 
separation of the Christian population in South Sudan may lead to even more 
enforcement of shari’a law in the north. However there are some indications that the 
increased political participation of women is making headway. In 2014 the country 
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passed a national law against forced prostitution and hosted a regional conference on 
anti-trafficking efforts in Africa.
87
 But based on the existing rights, for our analysis we 
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Chapter 6: Morocco 
 As a constitutional monarchy, power in Morocco is divided between a king, a 
prime minister, a bi-cameral legislature, and separate judiciary. The monarchy is passed 
down through lineage and the King claims his power as the “Commander of the Faithful” 
because he is considered a direct descendent of the prophet Muhammad. The king also 
retains the title of commander in chief and appoints the prime minister, based on 
whichever political party has won the most seats in parliament. The current monarch, 
King Mohammad VI, took power after the death of his father King Hassan II in 1999.88  
The current prime minister of Morocco is Abdelilah Benkirane. He was appointed 
prime minister in 2011 and is a member of the Justice and Development Party (PJD). The 
parliament of Morocco is divided into 2 houses, the 325 seat Assembly of 
Representatives and the 270 seat Assembly of Councilors. The parliament can approve 
bills, question ministers, control the budget and create commissions of inquiry to 
investigate government action.  
 
Ratification and Reservations  
Morocco ratified CEDAW on June 21, 1993, and has been party to the treaty for 
over 20 years. Morocco is one of several Islamic states that had stated reservations when 
it ratified the agreement. The largest reservation was against Article 2. Morocco refused 
to implement any part of CEDAW that threatened shari’a law and Morocco’s Code of 
Personal Status, also known as the moudouwana, which is based on the Malikite school 
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of Islamic law.89 Morocco then listed several specific articles in CEDAW that it objected 
to. It rejected the right to nationality under Article 9, stating that the nationality of 
children should come from their father, not their mother. It rejected the right of women to 
live and move freely without the permission of their spouse or male guardians under 
Article 15 and a woman’s right to divorce under Article 16. And similar to many 
CEDAW signatories both in and outside of the MENA region, Morocco listed a 
reservation against Article 29, which is the dispute mechanism that refers problems 
between states over CEDAW to the International Court of Justice. 90 
Morocco has submitted three periodic reports to the Committee since ratifying 
CEDAW. It turned in the first report in 1994, within a year of ratifying the convention. It 
submitted the second report in July of 1999, two years past the 1998 deadline. And it 
submitted its third and fourth reports in 2006 as a combined document. Morocco has not 
submitted any periodic reports since, even though the next reports were due in 2010 and 
2014 respectively.  
The number of women’s rights groups in Morocco has been increasingly steadily 
in the 20
th
 century, with fewer than 5 registered groups in the country prior to 1970 but 
23 new groups being founded between 1970 and 1984.91 In 1992, before ratifying 
CEDAW, King Hassan II met women’s rights activists in Morocco to hear their requests 
for amendments to the moudouwana. He included some of their recommendations in his 
1993 reforms of the Code of Personal Status, one of his first steps towards compliance 
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with CEDAW.92 In November of 1993, he established the Ministry for Human Rights, the 
first institution in the government designed to focus on human rights issues.93 A study 
done after the ratification of CEDAW in 1997 found that there were 76 NGOs in 
Morocco working to advance women’s issues, such as the “Democratic Association of 
Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action, and the Moroccan Association for 
Women's Rights.”94 This reflects the continued growth of civil society in the country. 
Now that we have some background on Morocco’s process of ratifying CEDAW we can 
review the change in Islamic women’s political and social rights in the state. 
 
Political Rights 
The first right to examine is the right to vote. Women have had the right to vote in 
Morocco since the country’s independence from France in 1956. The right is protected in 
Article 8 of Morocco’s constitution. 95 However voter participation in Morocco has 
changed significantly over the past several years. In 2007, only 37% of voters 
participated in the parliamentary election. The country was split between conservative 
Muslim political parties and progressive socialist parties, with conservatives dominating 
the voting booth through corrupt election behavior.96 Public protests were initially 
suppressed but over the next few years tension grew, ultimately leading to the Arab 
Spring movement in 2011. Morocco saw large public demonstrations by students in 
Casablanca and Rabat, leading the King to enact constitutional reforms that transferred 
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some of his power to parliament, such as the ability to elect a prime minister. These 
changes led to some restored faith in the constitutional monarchy system and an 
increased voter turnout in 2011 of 45%.97 
Women have also had the right hold public office in Morocco since the founding 
of the country. Article 12 of the constitution highlights this right, which is the second 
political right we want to review. 98 In 1997, only 2 out of 325 seats in the national House 
of Representatives went to female candidates. However the number of women running 
for office has steadily increased from 8 in 1977, 15 in 1984, 36 in 1993, to 69 in 1997. 
On a local level, 1,657 women ran for elections, about 1.6% of the total candidates, and 
83 women won seats, about .3% of the total elected in 1997.99 In its CEDAW reports 
Morocco attributes this poor participation number to high illiteracy among women, 
prevailing stereotypes against women in Moroccan society, and not enough economic 
mobility for women. However, for the first time, women have been appointed to and held 
positions as secretaries of state on the national level.100 
By the 2002 elections, 35 women won positions out of 325 seats in the House of 
Representatives, a significant improvement. Women were also appointed to the secretary 
general level in two national agencies for the first time in 2002.101 Civil society groups 
within Morocco pushed for a 12% quota to be implemented for government elections in 
2008, which continued to increase the number of women in public office, especially on 
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the local level. In 2003, women held 127 seats, less than 1% of vacant positions in local 
government. In 2009, women took over 3,400 local seats.102  
The next political right to review is the right to citizenship. The Moroccan 
Nationality Code of 1958 “grants women equal rights with men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality” but women cannot pass on their nationality to their husband or 
children.103 This is why Morocco has a reservation to Article 9 of CEDAW. In 2006, 
King Mohammed VI reformed this issue by announcing that children will be able to have 
their mother’s nationality. That same year, Morocco announced it planned to drop all its 
reservations to CEDAW.104 This was a historic step and was the result of intense political 
pressuring from women’s rights groups in the country. 
The final political right to review is women’s ability to own property. In the 
1990s during the initial ratification of CEDAW, in Morocco “women inherit only half as 
much as male heirs” under the moudouwana and male family members often pressured 
women to accept even less than that.105 Initially very little progress was made on this 
front, though the state did launch a 1998 program called the National Fund for 
Agricultural Loans which funded up to 90% of any new agricultural projects for women, 
helping to circumvent problems women face from their inability to inherit property 
equally.106  However the removal of Morocco’s stated reservations against CEDAW led 
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to constitutional reform on property rights, with women achieving almost full parity 
through a series of 2004 constitutional reforms by the King.  
  
Social Rights 
Social rights in Morocco have seen less progress since the passage of CEDAW 
because they are rooted in the Code of Personal Status. The first right we will review is 
the right to education. Article 13 of Morocco’s constitution says public education is free 
for all people regardless of sex.107 But as the Moroccan government revealed in its first 
periodic report to the CEDAW committee “the illiteracy rate for women is 67%, and 
89 % in rural areas, compared with 41 percent for men.”108 In its second report to 
CEDAW the Moroccan government set a goal of eradicating illiteracy, starting with 
getting up to 80% of girls to enroll in primary school by 2000.109 They attributed the 
illiteracy rates to lack of schools in rural communities and expectations for females to 
carry out domestic work at home rather than attend schools.  
The second right to examine is whether or not women can access contraception. 
In this area, Morocco is more progressive then many Islamic states. The use of birth 
control for family planning is legal in Morocco for married and unmarried women. 
According to the state “the rate of contraceptive use stands at 65.8% in urban areas and at 
no higher than 50.7% in rural areas.” Discrepancies in use are attributed to health literacy 
and low access to services.110 
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Limited access to education has compounded the third right we are examining, which 
is women’s right to be employed outside of the home. As of 1999, the country reported 
that “women constitute approximately 35% of the work force, with the majority in the 
industrial, service, and teaching sectors.”111 And while women were 34% of the primary 
and secondary school teaching staff in 1997 and 23% of the staff of higher education, no 
women have held the post of “academic director” and very few women have been deans 
or rectors of universities.112 This glass ceiling prevents women from gaining positions of 
power where they can create reform for themselves.  Morocco also struggles with the 
exploitation of young girls as prostitutes and domestic servants, known as “adoptive 
servitude.” NGOs, in 1999, estimated that tens of thousands of teenage women are 
working as prostitutes in Morocco’s cities.113 Since the passage of CEDAW, the number 
of women in the workforce appears to be decreasing, with the 2011 U.S. State 
Department report showing women only make up about 28% of the formal workforce. 
One reason this number may have lowered is that some informal forms of employment 
that women traditionally hold are no longer considered part of the formal workforce. 
There is also steep inequality within pay, with women earning about 25% of what men do 
in the state.114  
The final social right we are analyzing is if women are free from coerced marriage. 
This was one of the rights the King focused on in 1993 by ending the practice of forced 
marriage or “matrimonial constraint,” meaning the woman must agree to it on her own 
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for the marriage to be legal.115 Traditional shari’a law allowed a man to divorce his wife 
outside of court simply by rejecting her, but the 1993 reforms to the moudouwana require 
divorce to take place in court and for the woman to be present, though the woman did not 
have to consent to the divorce for it to go through. Conversely, a woman could only 
divorce a husband if he agrees, and in most cases this requires payment to the man, 
known as “a khol'a divorce.”116 Women’s rights activists in Morocco found these initial 
reforms to be very ineffective.  
Much work was done to push for greater reform during the Equality without 
Reservation regional MENA conference that was held in Rabat from June 8-10 in 2006. 
As a result of this organizing by NGOs, the King agreed to increase the minimum age for 
marriage from 15 to 18.117 And limits to polygamy added in the 1990s seemed to be 
taking effect, as seen in Morocco’s 2006 CEDAW report. As the report states, 
“Polygamous marriages decreased in number from 904 in 2004 to 841 in 2005, for a 
6.97% decline. This suggests that polygamy may ultimately disappear in practice.”118 
 
Conclusion 
Several issues not touched upon by our analysis are still in need of reform in 
Morocco, including the state’s laws around sexual assault. For example, marital rape is 
not a crime and domestic violence is underreported. A 2010 report revealed that 63% of 
Moroccan women said they had been victims of violence in the past year.  Sexual assaults 
are underreported because of the stigma around losing virginity “victim's families may 
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In March of 2012, 16 year old Amina Filali committed suicide after being forced 
to marry her rapist, who attacked her in 2011. The case pointed out several flaws in 
Morocco’s legal system, including article 475 of the penal code which allows for rape 
charges to be dropped if a woman marries her rapist and that even though Amina was 
under 18 the marriage was allowed as long as she and her parents agreed to it. In January 
of 2014, article 475 of the penal code was amended to correct the loophole, the result of 
women’s rights activists and public protests.
120
 
Morocco’s ranking by Freedom House since it ratified CEDAW has been 
generally the same – its annual report ranks 1 as the most free and 7 as the least.  In 2001, 
the first year with available data, Morocco ranked 4 on civil liberties and 5 on political 
rights, for an average score of 4.5 and a label of “partly free.” 
121
 It has stayed at almost 
that exact ranking for the last 15 years. Using our defined rankings of free, partially free, 
and not free, this case study’s analysis reveals that for Morocco political and social rights 
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Chapter 7: Jordan 
 Jordan is a constitutional monarchy that was established in 1946 when the country 
gained independence from Britain.
122
 The king appoints the 40 representatives in the 
Senate and the public elects the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies every four years. 
The crown has the majority of executive and legislative power, with the ability to appoint 
the prime minister and cabinet at will, and although the judiciary is independent it is 
highly responsive to political pressure and corruption. Jordan’s jurisprudence is rooted in 
the Napoleonic code of the Ottomans, tribal heritage, and shari’a law. While religious 
courts deal with social issues like family law and divorce, ultimately their decisions can 
be reviewed by the secular Court of Appeals, an interesting hybrid unique to Jordan.
123
 
 Women’s civil society groups have existed in Jordan since its independence, with 
the Jordanian Women’s Union being founded in 1945.
124
 Women’s groups pushed for 
Jordan to ratify CEDAW and got it published in the national gazette in 2007 so it has the 





Ratification and Reservations 
Jordan signed CEDAW in 1980 and ratified the agreement in 1992, one of the 
first Islamic states to do so.
126
 As part of the ratification process that same year the state 
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created the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) to oversee the rights of 
women in the state.
127
  
When it ratified CEDAW, Jordan entered four stated reservations to the 
convention. The first is against Article 9, which addresses the right of women to pass 
their nationality on to their children. The next reservation was against Article 15 on 
women’s right to adequate living conditions. Jordan’s interpretation of shari’a law holds 
that “a woman’s residence and domicile are with her husband.”
128
 The third and forth 
reservations are against Article 16, which deals with marriage and family law. The first 
reservation is against women’s rights to seek divorce and receive equal division of 
financial assets. The fourth and final reservation is against a woman’s right to custody of 
her children and freedom to work outside the home.
129
 
Jordan submitted its first periodic report to the CEDAW Committee in 1997, five 
years after it had ratified the convention. It submitted its second periodic report in 1999, 
perhaps in an attempt to correct this delay. Its third and forth reports were submitted 
together in 2006, and it is overdue for its fifth report to the Committee. 
 
Political Rights 
The evaluation of women’s political rights in Jordan must be kept in the larger 
context of limited political freedom in the state. Jordanians have the right to vote but 
cannot change the executive branch. Thus, evaluating a woman’s right to vote really 
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reflects the overall limited capacity of any voting rights in the state. Educated women 
received the right to vote in 1945, prior to independence, and in 1974 suffrage was given 
to all women.
130
 This push for universal suffrage was the result of organizing by civil 
society groups in the country. 
Women in Jordan can hold public office, although the opportunities to do so are 
limited to election to the lower house of Parliament or appointment by the king to a 
ministry. In 1993, the first two women were elected and appointed to the two houses of 
Parliament.
131
 As of 1999, three women had seats in the Senate and none had been 
elected to the lower house of Parliament in the most recent elections. The king had 
appointed one woman to be a minister in his cabinet.
132
 Overall, this low participation in 
political office reveals that ingrained stereotypes against women continue to hinder their 
political participation even though they have the legal right. 
Jordanian women’s right to citizenship has evolved slowly since the ratification of 
CEDAW. Prior to ratification, women had to have their husband’s permission to obtain a 
passport and could not pass their citizenship on to their children.
133
 The first restriction 
was overturned in 2003 and now women can travel without permission. However their 
children’s citizenship and movement is still dictated by the father.
134
 In 2009, Jordan 
removed it’s reservation to Article 15 of CEDAW, allowing women to maintain homes 
outside of their male guardians’ property.
135
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 The right to own property has seen less progress for Jordanian women. According 
to shari’a law, women can only inherit ½ of what male relatives inherit.
136
 Jordan’s 
Islamic courts also support the practice of welaya, or guardianship, meaning any single 
woman under the age of 40 is dependent on her closest male relative, regardless if the 
woman is widowed, divorced, or unmarried. If a woman rejects the guidance of her 
guardian she loses control of her financial independence.
137
 Technically women can own 
property and have business contracts independent of male relatives outside of the shari’a 
courts. But as a 2008 government report demonstrates, welaya is still practiced, with 






Jordan mirrors Saudi Arabia in some ways when it comes to the social right of 
access to education. Education is required and free for Jordanians up to age 16 but limits 
on women and their children’s citizenship lead to reduced access to public schools.
139
 
Private education is an option for some but is often expensive. As of 1999, women made 
up about 50% of university students.
140
 This number increased to 55% over the next ten 
years, but few women enter the labor market because they are not trained in the skills 
needed for existing jobs. 
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Women’s access to contraception is more open in Jordan than other Islamic states. 
In its first report to the CEDAW committee, Jordan reported that 35% of women had 
access to contraception.
141
 By 1999, it is reported that 52.6% of married women have 
used contraception, a significant increase. However patriarchal values around child 
bearing still exist. As the state wrote in its second periodic report “still a preference for 
male children, not only because they are more useful in the fields and orchards but also 
because, socially, the larger the family and the more boys as opposed to girls, the prouder 
the father.”
142
 The third and fourth periodic reports revealed contraceptive use to be the 
same nationally as in previous years, with higher use among women in urban areas rather 
than women in rural communities. The average family size in Jordan had been lowered 
from six children to five and there was an increased preference for the intrauterine device 
(IUD) over the pill or other methods of birth control.
143
 
With regard to the right to be employed outside of the home, Jordan has struggled 
to get women into the labor market. In 1990, women made up 2.6% of the labor market. 
Some of the reasons for this low turnout are the legal restrictions on the kind of work 
women can take on. Women cannot work from 8pm to 6am and are not allowed in certain 
industries, such as mining. Because of these limitations, women mainly work in social 
professions such as “education (41%), health and social work (15.1%), and personal, 
social, and service activities (5.7%)
144
 By 1999, women made up 14% of the work force 
but often still received much lower wages and work longer hours then their male 
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 In a step towards reform, in 2009 the JCNW opened the Women’s 
Complaint Office, where women can seek counsel on employment discrimination, 
citizenship rights, and violence. This development of domestic institutions is the result of 
rallying among women’s rights groups in the country.
146
 
A woman’s right to be free of coerced marriage is limited in Jordan. Women’s 
testimony in court only counts for ½ that of a man’s in the shari’a courts, and while 
abuse is grounds for divorce there is widespread acceptance of violence against women. 
This includes the practice of ‘honor killings,’ when a woman is killed in order to protect a 
family’s honor if she has engaged in adultery. Article 98 of the Penal Code suggests a 
sentence of three months to two years for such crimes, and the country reports at least 20 
honor killings each year.
147
 A particularly violent example of this took place in February 
1999 when “Hussein Suleiman ran over his pregnant sister Malak Suleiman three times 
with his pickup truck” after accusing her of adultery. She survived the attack but then 
after being released from the hospital was taken home and executed by her uncle, father, 
and brother. Her brother received 1 month in prison for the crime.
148
  
In 2001, an amendment to the Personal Status Law raised the minimum marriage 
age to 18 but allows judges to permit girls as young as 15 to marry with parental 
consent.
149
 Some recent progress against domestic violence was the 2007 opening of the 
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first women’s shelter and the passage in 2008 of the Family Protection Law to govern 





 Reviewing the change in women’s rights in Jordan since the ratification of 
CEDAW reveals a divide between attempted reforms by civil society groups and 
continued patriarchal values carried out in day-to-day life. From an initial ranking of 4.5 
and listed as partially free in 1999 by Freedom House, Jordan rose to a ranking of 5.5 in 
2010 as King Abdullah dissolved parliament to suppress political uprising that was part 
of the Arab Spring movement.
151
 This upheaval also played a role in limiting women’s 
political rights, though moving forward this tide may recede and allow for more political 
freedom. Based on our evaluation criteria Jordan will be ranked as partially achieving 






Chapter 8: Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, established in 1932 by King 
Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud. It is currently ruled by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and 
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has a population of over 28.6 million people.
152
 Saudi Arabia holds the Quran and Sunna 
to be the country’s legal foundation, formalized into the “Basic Law of Governance” 
rather than a constitution.
153
 The Basic Law does not allow for the formation of political 
parties or direct elections, meaning the royal family appoints and oversees all government 
offices. It also makes the development of a civil society very difficult, with most forms of 
activism being seen as political organizing and subject to arrest and punishment. 
The judiciary is separate from the monarchy but heavily influence by the opinions of 
the royal family and the ulema, the nation’s community of religious scholars.
154
 The 
military and police fall entirely under the jurisdiction of the monarchy. The Mutawaa'in, 
or religious police, are a subset of the police force that makes sure individuals adhere “to 
Islamic norms by monitoring public behavior” and are known for intimidation, abuse, and 
violence against citizens. With no written penal code, arrests and prosecution are left to 
the discretion of the police and judges. Adding to this is the state’s restrictive 
interpretation of shari’a law that uses punishments that violate international standards of 
human rights such as “flogging, amputation, and execution by beheading, stoning, or 
firing squad.”
155
 The country’s economy relies heavily on its oil production, with over 
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Ratification & Reservations 
Saudi Arabia ratified CEDAW through a royal decree on August 28, 2000.
157
 It 
was one of the last Islamic states to ratify the agreement. It entered three stated 
reservations to the convention but they reflect the state’s unwillingness to submit to the 
norms outlined in the treaty. The first is a sweeping, general reservation against any 
“contradiction between any term of the Convention and norms of Islamic law.”
158
 This 
effectively allows Saudi Arabia to pick and choose the rights within CEDAW it will 
uphold. The second reservation is against Article 9, which addresses nationality. At the 
time of its ratification of CEDAW Saudi Arabia did not allow women to confer their 
nationality to their children, which is why it did not agree with Article 9.
159
 The third and 
final reservation is against Article 29, the dispute mechanism. Like many CEDAW 
signatories, Saudi Arabia does not want to submit itself to the authority of the ICJ. 
160
 
Saudi Arabia submitted its first and second periodic reports to the CEDAW 
committee in 2007 as one document. It has not submitted a report since, even though the 
next periodic report was due in 2011. The combined report addresses some but not all of 
the rights outlined in CEDAW and fails to acknowledge many of the harsher truths about 
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Political Rights 
The first right to review is a woman’s right to vote. Historically, Saudi Arabia has 
held very few elections because the monarchy appoints all government positions. 
However in 2005 the state reinstituted municipal council elections, which had not taken 
place since the 1960s.  Women were prohibited from voting in the 2005 elections. But the 
restriction was grounded in not being able to make voting spaces separated by gender and 
thus legal under social codes. Women were not prohibited on the grounds that they did 
not have the right to vote. This distinction proves interesting when we look at the next 
political right, the ability to hold political office. 
There are no elected offices in the national government. The King appoints the 
Council of Ministers, which oversees all government offices and the 150 members of the 
Consultative Council, who advise the King.
161
 In 2006, women were appointed to be 
advisors to the Consultative Council. That year the king also placed women as deputies in 
the education and healthcare ministries; the highest positions women have received to 
date in the government.
162
 Then, in January 2013, a royal decree announced that women 
would be given 20% of the seats in the Consultative Council, and 30 were appointed the 
following month. This came on the heels of a 2011 announcement that women would be 
allowed to vote and run for seats in 2015 municipal elections.
163
  
The third political right in our analysis is the right to citizenship. Throughout the 
20
th
 century women in Saudi Arabia had citizenship almost entirely through their male 
relatives, such as a father or spouse, and could not transfer their nationality to their 
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children. A 2007 royal decree said divorced or widowed women who were not originally 
Saudi would no longer lose their citizenship and could remain in the country. 
164
 
However women still cannot pass their citizenship on to their children, and in practice 
have very little mobility to travel in or outside of the country without the supervision of a 
male guardian. 
The last political right under review is the right to own property. Women are 
allowed to own property in Saudi Arabia and in the past several years the monarchy has 
strengthened this right by adding in provisions about owning commercial licenses for 
business. One motivation for this is a desire to keep companies within the country owned 
by Saudi citizens rather than foreign nationals. In this instance, women’s right to property 
is a mix of progress and a continued limitation, with women being able to control 
property in name but sometimes being used as proxies by male relatives who want to 




The right to education further  reveals contradictions in rights for women in Saudi 
Arabia. Public education is free for all Saudi citizens and in 2004 primary school became 
required for children age 6-15, with the Ministry of Education’s long-term goal of 
making secondary school compulsory as well.
166
 Women made up 58% of university 
students in 2005. 
167
 And more women than men are in graduate school, with 79% of 
PhDs going to women in 2004.
168
 However, schools are separated by gender and women 
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often struggle to travel safely to and from school, frequently being harassed by the police. 
An extreme case of this persecution occurred in 2002 when the Mutawaa'in refused to let 
schoolgirls flee a burning building because they were not wearing their outer cloaks, 
abayas, to cover themselves in public in accordance with shari’a law. As a result 15 girls 
died in the fire and the police were not punished.
169
 
Access to contraception is also an extremely limited right for women in Saudi 
Arabia. Sex outside of marriage is illegal, so birth control is only available to women 
who are married. In its only report to the CEDAW Committee the Saudi government 
stated that all forms of contraception are available and a study from 1991-2002 revealed 
that 32% of married women in Saudi Arabia used a form of contraception. And a 1996 
study said that 81% of married women knew how to use contraception and over 43% had 
used a method in the past.
170
 These figures are difficult to trust given the high stigma 
around contraception use even in married women, and little to no data exists on the use of 
contraceptives among unmarried women in the U.S. State Department or Freedom 
House’s human rights reports on Saudi Arabia. 
The right of women to be employed outside of the home exists in theory but 
several other limitations on women make participation in the labor market extremely 
difficult. In Saudi Arabia women are not allowed to gather in public and cannot travel 
domestically or abroad without permission from their male relatives, making working 
outside the home difficult.
171
 For those women who do work, most are employed in the 
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public sector, 84% working in education.
172
 It is also illegal for women to socialize with 
men in public. When women violate this separation they can be accused of “khulwa,” the 
illegal mixing of unrelated men and women, and be punished by the police.
173
 This forces 
workplaces to be segregated, or more often, simply bars women from working at 
restaurants, factories, stores, and other common private institutions. Women are also not 
allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia, which is another inhibiting factor for working outside 
the home. Most women who work do so in same-sex schools or in healthcare, jobs that 
take place in institutions segregated by gender.
174
 In 2002, some reforms were made and 
women were allowed to apply for civil-status ID cards without the permission of their 
closest male relative, mahram, which would allow them to travel within the country. 
However women’s participation in the workforce remains some of the lowest in the 
world at about 14% according to statistics from 2009.
175
 
A woman’s right to marry in Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most restrictive of the 
social rights that this research program examines. There is no minimum age for marriage, 
and a woman’s consent is not required for a marriage to be legal. Thus child-brides and 
girls being sold into marriage to pay family debts is a common practice.
176
 If a woman 
wants to marry a non-Saudi she must have the permission of the government. Men can 
take up to four wives, making polygamy legal. 
177
 Men can divorce at will in Saudi 
Arabia, but women can only divorce their husbands if he “has deserted her, is impotent, 
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or has a loathsome disease” and must have another male represent her in the courts.
178
A 
2004 National Dialogue Conference on Women, hosted by Prince Abdullah, suggested 
women be allowed to study law so they could represent other women in family court on 
issues like divorce and custody. A few universities then began to allow women to study 
law and in 2007, the Ministry of Justice announced it would allow these women to act as 
legal consultants though not as lawyers.
179
 The King, rather than civil society groups, 




There are several other social rights that we did not examine in our analysis that also 
impact women’s freedom in Saudi Arabia. Similar to Morocco, domestic violence and 
sexual assault are underreported. There is no legal protection against domestic violence 
and for a woman to prove a rape she must prove it with her attackers confession or the 
testimony of four male witnesses.
180
  
Saudi Arabia has consistently received a ranking of 7, the worst possible score, from 
Freedom House’s annual human rights report from 1999 to the present. However King 
Abdullah, who ruled from 2005 to 2015, seemed to have some interest in expanding 
human rights, especially the rights of women. Prior to taking the throne, he supported 
progressive reforms like allowing employed women over the age of 40 to drive, although 
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 In 2004, he supported the creation of the National Society for 
Human Rights, an NGO focused on reviewing human rights violations. Ten of its 41 
initial members were women.
182
 However, the fact that all reform must come from the 
monarchy limits the hope of progress in Saudi Arabia. Thus for our evaluation, political 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
 By reviewing the change in women’s political and social rights in Sudan, 
Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia we have been able to test the two hypothesizes of this 
research study. The first addressed the role of reservations in CEDAW: 
H1: Arab States that have ratified CEDAW and do not have a stated reservation 
to Article 2 have seen improvement in women’s rights since ratification. And 
those countries who are not CEDAW participants or have reservations that 
essentially nullify the treaty, conversely have not seen improvements in women’s 
rights. 
We labeled our control, Sudan, not a participant in CEDAW, as not achieving 
political and social rights for women. This supports H1 because Sudan is a non-
participant.  Saudi Arabia has a reservation against Article 2, which essentially nullifies a 
state’s participation in the treaty. Saudi Arabia also has a general reservation against any 
piece of CEDAW that violates the sovereignty of its monarchy or violates shari’a law 
also supports H1. As Neumayer explained in his scholarship on RUDs, general 
reservations like the one Saudi Arabia submitted also nullify a state’s participation in a 
treaty.
183
 And our case study of Saudi Arabia labeled it as a state that has not achieved 
political and social rights for women. 
Morocco initially had a stated reservation to Article 2 but eventually repealed all 
of its reservations to the convention. An interesting point of this process is that the 
removal of reservations in 2006 was a result of women’s civil society groups earning 
more of a voice in the state. Our analysis ranked Morocco as partially achieving political 
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and social rights for women. Jordan did not have a stated reservation to Article 2 and also 
ranked as partially achieving political and social rights for women. The progress in 
Morocco and Jordan supports H1. 
The second hypothesis of this research program argued that CEDAW would 
create more change in political rights than social rights: 
H2: More progress has been made in political rights rather than social rights in 
states that have ratified CEDAW. 
 In our control case study of Sudan we saw some progress on women’s political 
participation in the state and no movement on social rights. Since Sudan did not sign 
CEDAW this progress does not reveal much about H2 though it does challenge the idea 
that CEDAW ratification is necessary for political change. But since H2 does not make 
that strong of a claim it still holds up.  
 Our other three case studies all support H2 in that they saw more progress in 
political rights than social rights. Jordan and Saudi Arabia saw limited movement in 
social rights because of adherence to shari’a law’s treatment of marriage and divorce. 
But political rights did progress in both countries within the confines of their political 
systems. For example, women began to be involved in the Council of Ministers and 
Consultative Council, which are appointed positions, but have yet to be allowed to vote in 
a national election.  
 The theory behind H2 is that civil society in a state can utilize CEDAW 
ratification to push for change in democratic institutions within the state. This is based in 
Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang’ theory of change.
184
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councils often control social rights in Islamic states, our case studies revealed that 
activists had more success challenging political rights through state institutions and 
national leaders. For example, in Morocco activists were able to influence the writing of 
the periodic CEDAW reports, a formal vehicle for influencing political rights. However 
changes to the Personal Code, which governs social rights in Morocco, were more 
difficult to achieve and had to come directly from the king. 
 
Further Questions 
 This research program was limited in the scope and depth of its analysis by 
several factors, including the decision to do a qualitative review and the selection of only 
four case studies. Because CEDAW clearly delineates over a dozen rights of women, 
further research projects could employ a quantitative analysis of progress on those rights. 
Gaps in information, especially the lack of periodic reports to the CEDAW committee by 
member states may make this kind of analysis difficult. However, as Cole demonstrated 
in his 2013 analysis, quantitative research on CEDAW’s impact can be achieved.
185
 
 The role of human rights treaties in implementing international norms remains an 
area rich with research opportunities. The newly enacted Optional Protocol within 
CEDAW would be an interesting apparatus for studying enforcement and compliance 
with international human rights norms. More research could also be done on violations of 
CEDAW reported by individuals, especially civil society groups in member states. These 
are questions for future researchers to employ and hopefully will lead to a continued 
dialogue on how to improve women’s access to political and social rights. 
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